L Introduction
In recent months it has become increasingly popular among United States citizens seeking divorces to forsake the time-honored trek to Reno, and head instead for the outlying territory of the Virgin Islands. This change in direction of the so called "divorce trade" is due to the comparative ease with which one can obtain a divorce decree and the attractions of the Islands. For those who can afford the trip, it is thought that two birds can be killed with one stone, so to speak: a divorce obtained and a restful vacation enjoyed.
By provision of Congress, the Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands was set up to enact legislation applicable to the Virgin Islands as a whole,' the District Court of the Virgin Islands being given jurisdiction of all cases of divorce and annulment of marriage. 2 The current divorce law was enacted by the eighth Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands on December 18, 1944; approved December 29, 1944, by the acting Governor; and went into effect on January 28, 1945. The law gives as grounds 3 for either party to obtain a legal separation, or to have their marriage contract dissolved, at the plantiff's option, for: adultery, cruelty, impotency, desertion for one year, habitual drunkenness for one year, conviction of a felony, insanity, and incompatibility of temperament. 4 If the marriage was not celebrated in the district of the suit, before commencing action, the plaintiff must have been an inhabitant for a six-week period; such period being declared "Sufficient to give the court jurisdiction without regard to the place where the marriage was performed or the cause of action arose." '5 When the dissolution judgment has become final, and after the expiration of time for appeal, either spouse may remarry again without further limitation of time. 6 With the leniency 7 of the divorce law in effect, plus the tourist attraction of the locale, it is little wonder that prosperous United States citizens with the intent to sever marital relations are taking advantage of the new divorce mecca. The advantage of a divorce from a United States Federal court over the "quickies" from Mexico 5 in contrast to the Nevada divorce-mill towns, and for Easterners, at least, the shorter distance-all add to the attractiveness of transacting such business in the tropic Islands. In fact, the short residence requirement coupled with the liberal i'compatibility cause looks suspiciously like a deliberate tourist-trade bid. ' Although there are no reported Supreme Court decisions as of April 1953, under the present doctrine of the United States Supreme Court there is considerable doubt that a state court, or presumably any foreign court, would be precluded from collaterally attacking the finality of the decision of the jurisdiction giving the finding of domicil.
10 Here then we come upon the problem. Where both parties are domiciled in the jurisdiction of the forum, or where the defendant appears personally in an action brought by the plaintiff in his domicil, decrees have been accorded full faith and credit.' The difficulty, and our problem, arises where the plaintiff takes up residence in the Islands, brings action there, claiming it to be his domicil (although it is not the last bona fide marital domicil), the defendant domiciled elsewhere' 0 being 1122 So. CAxir. L. R a. 155, 155 (1949) . Also see 1953 WASH. U. L. Q.
98.
22 Although comity depends on the states themselves, the Virgin Islands are a territory of the United States and necessarily are under the Constitution, the full faith and credit clause applying the same as to any other state or possession. 2 3 U. S. CoxsT., ART. IV § 1. 
III. The Williams Cases
The long-standing tenure of the Haddock case doctrine was expressly overruled by the first Williams case. 26 In this case a man and woman were charged with bigamous cohabitation in North Carolina after having obtained divorces from their respective previous spouses in the state of Nevada. The North Carolina Supreme Court had upheld the lower court conviction. 27 The United States Supreme Court held that the establishment of a bona fide domicil in Nevada, not having been challenged by the North Carolina Court, the court of the latter state is bound by, and must recognize and show respect to, the Nevada decree. This was true although jurisdiction over the respondents had been obtained by substituted service, and the recognition of such divorces offended North Carolina policy.
So the first Williams case restored the constructive service prop to foreign-divorce, holding that if the suing party, man or woman, is domiciled in the granting state, service by publication on the nonresident spouse is sufficient service. "The rule was now unmistakable that a foreign divorce grounded upon constructive service... was entitled to full faith and credit in all states." 3 1 This time the record presented the precise question whether North Carolina had the right to refuse full faith and credit to the Nevada divorce decrees because, contrary to findings of the Nevada court, the North Carolina jury had found no bona fide domicil was acquired in Nevada. The Supreme Court affirmed the North Carolina position, holding that North Carolina was entitled to find that petitioners did not acquire domicil in Nevada, and that the Nevada court was, therefore, without power to liberate the petitioners from amenability to the laws of North Carolina governing domestic relations.
In the second Williams case, the trial jury found that the defendants went to Nevada with the intent to get divorces and then to return immediately to North Carolina. The Supreme Court said that the judicial power to grant divorce jurisdiction was founded on domicil, a state having the authority to ascertain the existence of that crucial fact. "As to the truth or existence of a fact, like that of domicil, upon which depends the power to exert judicial authority, a State not a party to the exertion of such judicial authority in another State but seriously affected by it has a right, when asserting its own unquestioned authority, to ascertain the truth or existence of that crucial fact." 8 3 2 "But simply because the Nevada Court found that it had power to award a divorce decree cannot . . . foreclose reexamination by another state." 83 The North Carolina Supreme Court had said that the jury was instructed that if the defendants went to Nevada with the requisite intent and actually acquired domicil there, though they later changed their minds and returned to North Carolina, then the courts of Nevada would have acquired valid jurisdiction and the decrees would have been entitled to full faith and credit.
4
Williams (II) did not expressly overrule Williams (I), the court being careful to distinguish them. The Supreme Court did not return to the old concept of "marital domicil" but created two new expressions: "domiciliary origin" and "old domiciliary states." The result appears that the finding of domicil is a fact and such finding by one state's court is not binding on another's; all that is needed to disregard it being some evidence that the jury may reasonably conclude that there was no domiciliary intent when the decree was rendered. The Supreme Court seemed to leave the problem hanging on the rather vague term "domicil" and the finding of "jurisdictional fact. ''3 5 The doctrine seems to emerge that foreign divorce grounded on constructive service plus bona fide domicil 8 " of the plaintiff must be recognized when based on the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit. But the states are left free to make inquiry as to whether the granting state had lacked proper jurisdiction. Since the granting state found bona fide domicil, the refusal of another to recognize the divorce is subject to review by the United States In 1948 Sherrer v. Sherrer 44 strengthened the Davis decision. The Supreme Court held that, where H appeared personally in W's Florida divorce proceedings, and did not litigate the court's jurisdiction specifically, when he later sought a Massachusetts declaration placing in issue the validity of his wife's domicil at the time, the full faith and credit clause requirement barred his collateral attack on jurisdictional grounds. He had participated in the litigation and had, in effect, his day in court. The issue, under the circumstances, was no longer open. Thus we see that the Supreme Court makes the divorce uncertainty worse by recognizing divisible-divorce. On the basis of Estin v. Estin" and Kreiger v. Kreiger, 9 we see the court saying that regardless of the laws of the divorcing state, if under the law of the home state an ex parte decree does not terminate a prior support order, that order remains in effect despite foreign divorce. Thus, we see the Supreme Court saying that one can have a divorce recognized for some purposes and not for others.
In Johnson v. Mtuelberger, 50 where a Florida divorce was attacked by the parties' daughter in New York, the court held that when, as in the Sherrer case, the defendant spouse appears in the divorce action, or is personally served, the (Florida) court's finding of jurisdiction may not be collaterally attacked in another state by anyone, if it is not subject to such attack in the divorcing state. In Cook v. Cook 5 this position was strengthened, the court stating that "until Florida's jurisdiction is shown to be vulnerable, Vermont may not relitigate the issue of domicil upon which the Florida decree rests." Sutton v. Lieb 52 held that where W was not personally served and did not enter appearance in a Nevada divorce suit, the divorce decree was subject to attack and nullification by the New York court for lack of jurisdiction over the parties, and the New York decree invalidating the Nevada divorce, entered in TV's separate maintenance proceeding in New York, was entitled to full faith and credit in Nevada as well as Illinois where the instant suit was brought. But "Illinois is free to decide ... the effect of New York's declaration of annulment on the obligations of the respondent, a stranger to that decree.' 252a V. Application to the Virgin Islands Decrees Examining our Virgin Islands divorce decrees in the light of these cases and the present Supreme Court standing as set forth in Rl v. 265, 281 (1950 The court went on to hold that the plaintiff had satisfied the requirement of domicil, as he had lived and and worked in the Virgin Islands for nine or ten months and was presently employed there with the intent to remain. The court construed the incompatibility of temperament to refer "to conflicts in personalities and dispositions so deep as to be irreconcilable and to render it impossible for parties to continue a normal marital relationship with each other.' "5 The court said that the ground did not include petty bickering and quarrels. The facts of the case, however, show that the defendantwife brought a counterclaim; therefore, this particular case would be foreclosed from later attack by the Davis decision, and a state court would be very hard put to find that the plaintiff did not have a bona fide Virgin Islands domicil. Therefore, this case does not offer a ready solution to our problem.
Most people currently combining divorce and diversion in the DIVORcE LAW 0r THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, LAws 1944 , Bill No. 14, § 9. U 195 F. 2d 799, 805 (3rd Cir. 1952 . See also, Gage v. Gage, 89 F. Supp. 987 (D. C. D. C. 1950), which held that if the plaintiff is to establish a domicil so as to give the court jurisdiction for the purpose of divorce, there must be at least no intention of plaintiff to live elsewhere, and no intention to leave as soon as the divorce can be obtained.
-195 F. 2d 799, 807 (3rd Cir. 1952).
southern clime do not intend to live there beyond the time it will take them to procure a divorce. Evidence of a round-trip ticket purchased before they left home might be enough to invalidate their divorces on their return home. Rice v. Rice 5 7 held, in an action for declaratory judgment, that divorce in Nevada did not dissolve marriage in Connecticut, and evidence of a request for leave and a request for extension of that leave from the plaintiff's government job supported a finding that the plaintiff did not have a Nevada domicil and the Nevada court lacked jurisdiction. Moritz v. Moritz 5 held that the plaintiff could not qualify as a legal voter of New York and sue for divorce in the District of Columbia as a resident at the same time. Thus it would seem that about the only sure way to be secure in one's divorce would be actually to intend to stay when one went down to the Islands and be able to prove domicil.
50
This alternative hardly would be satisfactory for most divorce seekers. The conclusion unhappily seems to be that unless and until the Supreme Court changes its present policy by deciding on a reasonable requirement to meet due process and grant full faith and credit, and substitute that for domicil, or a Uniform Divorce Law is created, 60 those with Virgin Islands divorces will be subject to the perils of shaky and uncertain marital status.
.7 336 U. S. 674 (1949) . r8 80 F. Supp. 267 (Sup. Ct. D. C. 1936). 59 Domicil is, "That place in which a man has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with the present intention of making a permanent home, for an unlimited or indefinite period."
BEAcxs LAW DIOTioNARY, 3rd Ed., p. 608. 60 There has been marked lack of support by the states in this movement. For a treatment of the history see, 1952 WASH. U. L. Q. 98.
